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NOTES
WRONGFUL BIRTH: JUDICIAL RETICENCE WITH AN EMERGING
TORT:

THE NEGLIGENT

PERFORMANCE OF GENETIC COUNSEL-

ING-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

In Berman v. Allan' the Supreme court of New Jersey addressed
the topics of wrongful birth and wrongful life2 for the first time since
its much quoted decision of Gleitman v. Cosgrove.' The Gleitman
decision was the first in what has developed into a series of cases in
which a physician's alleged negligent errors in prenatal diagnosis or
genetic counseling and testing is claimed to have thwarted the parents'
desire not to give birth to a child suffering from severe physical and
mental abnormalities.' Characteristic of the negligent genetic counsel1. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
2. The phrases "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" have been applied to suits
with a variety of fact patterns. "Wrongful life" was first used to describe the child's
cause of action when a child sued his father for allowing him to be born a bastard.
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). In Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, the phrase was applied to a child's action against a physician who had failed
to warn the child's mother that he might be born with defects resulting from the
Rubella (German Measles) she contracted during pregnancy. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). In both types of suits, the courts have characterized the
child's contention as claiming that he should not be alive; that his existence is
"wrongful."
"Wrongful birth" is the label attached to the parents' cause of action in cases
such as Gleitman, in which the parents have received inaccurate and allegedly negligent
genetic counseling and/or testing and have subsequently given birth to a child with
severe physical and mental abnormalities. See Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). "Wrongful birth" has also been applied to cases
in which a negligently performed sterilization operation has resulted in the birth of an
unwanted child. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). In both situations, the parents assert that their child should not have been born.
3. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
4. Throughout this note "genetic counseling cases" will be the label used to refer
to cases involving the allegedly negligent failure of the physician or laboratory to provide accurate preconception and prenatal information and testing to prospective
parents. The original genetic counseling cases involved children born with physical and
mental abnormalities because the mother had contracted Rubella (German Measles)
during the first trimester of pregnancy. See, e.g., Stewart v. Long Island College
Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.2d 502, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1970) (hospital refused to provide abortion to mother who had had
Rubella); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975), rev'g, 507 S.W.2d 288 (Civ.
App. 1974) (physician negligently failed to diagnose mother's illness as Rubella and to
warn her of the risks to her fetus); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975) (physician negligently failed to diagnose mother's illness as
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ing cases' is the parents' allegation that either they would not have
Rubella, failed to determine she was pregnant, and failed to warn her of the risks to
her fetus).
More recently the courts have heard cases in which the physician failed to detect
hereditary or genetic birth defects as opposed to environmentally determined defects
(such as those cause by the mother's contracting Rubella). See, e.g., Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (negligent performance of Tay-Sachs testing and amniocentesis); Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 2 Civ. No. 58192 (Cal. Ct. App., filed July 11, 1980) (negligent testing of
parents and failure to identify them as Tay-Sachs carriers); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (negligent failure to advise
mother of risks of Down's Syndrome and availability of amniocentesis); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (negligent failure to warn mother of
risks of Down's syndrome and availability of amniocentesis).
Technological advancements concerning genetic abnormalities and an improved
ability to detect their presence through a procedure called amniocentesis have made
these suits possible. Amniocentesis is an intrauterine testing procedure that can be performed in the sixteenth week of pregnancy to determine the presence of certain genetic
abnormalities in the fetus. In Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 92 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Friedman], the author describes the procedure, the types of defects capable of detection, the risks of the procedure, and the
possible legal consequences stemming from this medical advancement. The most frequent genetic disorders appearing in suits to date are Down's Syndrome and Tay-Sachs
disease. Mothers over the age of 35 have a substantially greater risk of bearing a child
with Down's Syndrome than do younger mothers. See Annas & Coyne, "Fitness"for
Birth and Reproduction: Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, 9 FAM. L.Q. 463,
469 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Annas & Coyne]. Children born with Down's Syndrome may suffer from fatal heart diseases and, more certainly, will be severely mentally retarded. Friedman, supra, at 100 n.34. Through the amniocentesis procedure,
the physician can detect whether the fetus will be afflicted with the Syndrome. See Annas & Coyne, supra, at 469-72. Tay-Sach's disease is characterized by "blindness,
severe mental retardation and death, usually before three and four years of age. It is
most common in Jews of Northern European origin (Ashkenazy Jews)." Friedman,
supra, at 101 (quoting Friedman, PrenatalDiagnosis of Genetic Disease, 225 SC. AM.,
Nov., 1971, at 36). Preconception testing of the parents coupled with amniocentesis
can determine whether the fetus will be afflicted.
5. Professor Capron provides the following definition for genetic counseling in
Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 621 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Capron], (quoting Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Counseling,
Genetic Counseling, 27 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 204-41 (1975)):
Genetic Counseling is a communicative process which deals with the human problems associated with the occurrence or the risk of occurrence, of a genetic disorder
in a family. This process involves an attempt by one or more appropriately trained
persons to help the individual or family to (1) comprehend the medical facts, including the diagnosis, probable course of the disorder, and the available management; (2) appreciate the way heredity contributes to the disorder, and the risk of
recurrence in specified relatives; (3) understand the alternatives for dealing with
the risk of recurrence; (4) choose the course of action which seems to them appropriate in view of the risks, their family goals, and their ethical and religious
standards, and to act in accordance with that decision; and (5) to make the best
possible adjustment to the disorder in an affected family member and/or to the
risk of recurrence of that disorder.
Capron points out that the area of genetic counseling provides a number of areas in
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conceived 6 or, more frequently, that they would have aborted their afflicted fetus' had the physician not been remiss in diagnosing the impairments their child would suffer. Further, the parents usually bring
an action on behalf of their child based upon his or her crippling abnormalities.'

Such a claim was made by the parents and their physically and
mentally impaired child in Gleitman. 9 The decision came at a time

when abortions were, for the most part, illegal'0 and when the courts
were denying parents' causes of action in negligent sterilization cases
on the premise that the birth of a child was always a benefit and never
a compensable injury."I Thus, when the Gleitmans claimed to have
which the professional (usually a physician) may encounter difficulties. For example, it
is an area of rapidly expanding knowledge and the requisite standard of care is as yet
not certain. To enable correct diagnosis there is considerable information that must be
gathered which may involve a number of clinical and laboratory tests that must be
properly performed. Further, the physician must make certain that the information is
conveyed in a comprehensible manner so that the alternatives are made clear. Capron,
supra, at 624-29.
6.

In Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub

nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978),
the parents had previously given birth to a child with polycystic kidneys who had died
from the affliction. The mother's physician had assured them that the disease was not
hereditary yet they subsequently gave birth to a second child with the same affliction.
The parents contended, inter alia, that had they been properly advised that the condition was hereditary and had the proper preconception tests been administered to determine if they would give birth to another afflicted child, they would never have conceived the second child.
7. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
8. See Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 75, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (1977)
(child's action sought damages for pain and suffering, for having to live an impaired
life, and for lost future earnings).
9. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
10. The New Jersey statute at the time of the decision was not particularly clear
on what constituted a legal abortion; the statute merely forbade an abortion "without
lawful justification." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West) (statute subsequently declared
unconstitutional in Y. W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972)). Although
the majority opinion in Gleitman focused less on the possible illegality of abortion and
more on the public policy militating against abortion, the concurring opinion of
Justice Francis stressed that a eugenic abortion (one performed because of physical or
mental abnormalities in the fetus) was against the law. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 32, 227 A.2d 689, 698 (1967) (Francis, J., concurring). Justices Jacobs and Weintraub in their separate dissenting opinions reached the opposite conclusion on the
legality of eugenic abortions. Id. at - , 227 A.2d at 706, 710. Nonetheless, the
Gleitman decision predated the Supreme Court's decision of Roe v. Wade in which the
Court found that the mother's decision to abort during the first trimester of pregnancy
fell within her constitutional right to privacy and, as such, was not subject to state interference. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. The belief that the birth of a child was a blessed event and not a compensable
injury was first articulated in Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620
(1934), a case involving a physician's allegedly negligent performance of a vasectomy
and the subsequent birth of a healthy child. At the time Gleitman was decided, no
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been negligently denied the opportunity to abort because of the physician's inaccurate assurance the fetus would be unaffected by Mrs.
Gleitman's Rubella, the court found the claim was not actionable."2
Public policy, the court reasoned, was against abortion. The court
found as a second obstacle to recovery the impossibility of measuring
the joys and benefits of parenthood against the alleged emotional and
pecuniary losses resulting from raising their special child.' 3 The court
also dismissed the child's cause of action saying the child had made it
impossible to assess his damages by claiming he should not have been
born or had been wronged by not being aborted." Nonexistence is a
state which is incapable of evaluation, the court reasoned, and therefore the comparison between what the child must suffer in his impaired
state and what he would endure if consigned to nonexistence cannot be
made. 'I
Over a decade has passed since Gleitman, and though the decision
has had a significant impact on genetic counseling and, to an extent,
negligent sterilization cases, much has changed in the interim. Medical
technology has greatly improved the ability to predict and detect the
existence of severe genetic and chromosomal birth defects, and eugenic
abortions have been recognized as a legitimate means for reducing the
incidence of these tragic lives.'" Paralleling these medical advancements has been the Supreme Court's recognition that the decision
to procreate and the decision to abort within the first trimester of
pregnancy fall within the woman's constitutional right to privacy and
court had held otherwise and thus parents seeking compensation for the birth of an unwanted child after a negligent sterilization operation were not viewed as having been
damaged. See also Shaker v. Knight, 1 Pa. D.&C.2d 41 (1957). A few months after
the Gleitman decision, however, another court allowed the parents compensation
recognizing that the birth of an unwanted child could create considerable hardships
rather than being a "blessed event." Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
12. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
13. Id. at __
, 277 A.2d at 692. Justice Jacobs in his dissenting opinion argued
in favor of allowing the parents to maintain a cause of action because they had been
lead to rely on the inaccurate assurances by the physician. The resulting birth of their
defective child was, therefore, a wrong that should be redressed. Id. at - , 227 A.2d
at 703. Justice Weintraub, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued that the parents
should be allowed to maintain an action for having been denied the opportunity to
make the decision to abort or not. Id. at __
, 227 A.2d at 707.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally Annas & Coyne, supra note 4, and Friedman, supra note 4, for
a discussion of the abilities of medical technology to predict and detect genetic abnormalities and the use of eugenic abortion as a means for reducing the incidence of such
hereditary diseases.
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are not subject to state interference.' 7 There has also been an increasing tendency for courts to find that the birth of a child after a
negligently performed sterilization operation is not always a
"blessing" but rather can be an injury for which the law will provide
compensation.s Further, negligent genetic counseling cases have increased in frequency and courts have begun to recognize them as

actionable claims for relief.' 9

This note will examine the Berman decision within the context of

the trends in genetic counseling and negligent sterilization cases that
have evolved since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Gleitman.
The note will also discuss an alternative approach to addressing both

the parents' and child's cause of action.
FACTS AND HOLDING

When Mrs. Berman became pregnant at age 38, she sought the professional services of two gynecology and obstetrics specialists, Drs.
Allan and Attardi. Not until Mrs. Berman gave birth to a daughter
suffering from the chromosomal disorder of Down's Syndrome 20 did
she become aware that her age placed her in a high risk group for bear17. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that
the couple's decision to procreate or use some method of contraception fell within their
constitutionally protected right to privacy. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the
Court extended this constitutional protection to a woman's decision to abort in the first
trimester of pregnancy.
18. There is still a split of authority concerning whether the parents of an unwanted child should be compensated because of a physician's negligent performance of
a sterilization operation. With increasing frequency courts are allowing compensation
for the expenses involved in the birth and raising of the child. See, e.g., Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (negligent vasectomy); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (negligent error in filling contraceptive prescription); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Spec. Term
1974) (negligent vasectomy); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496
(1976) (negligent tubal ligation).
Commentators have also tended to support this shift towards compensation. See,
e.g., Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1409 (1977); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to
the Unborn: PrenatalInjuries, PreconceptionInjuries, and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE
L.J. 1401 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
Some courts, nonetheless, have maintained the posture that the birth of a healthy
child is not a compensable injury. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975) (unsuccessful tubal ligation); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973) (unsuccessful tubal ligation).
19. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (allowing medical expenses for treating child); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (allowing special costs to treat child's condition); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 76, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (allowing expenses of caring
for child's defects).
20. See note 4 supra.
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ing a child with this disorder. Her doctors had not informed her that
through a procedure called amniocentesis" she could have verified that
her fetus had this disorder. The Bermans contended that the physicians
had deviated from sound medical practice by not informing them of
the risks involved and the availability of tests." They further alleged
that had they been properly informed, Mrs. Berman would have
undergone the procedure and upon learning of the results, aborted the
afflicted fetus. The Bermans sought compensation for the expenses
they would encounter in raising, educating, and supervising their child
and for the emotional distress they had suffered and would continue to
suffer because of the child's condition. The child sought compensation
for her physical and emotional pain and suffering. "3
The trial court, relying upon the holding of Gleitman v. Cosgrove
as controlling precedent, granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment finding the plaintiffs had failed to state an actionable claim
for relief.24 When the New Jersey Supreme Court certified the case for
review on its own motion, the court found that the parents had stated
an actionable claim for relief.25 Damages were limited, however, to
compensation for the emotional distress the parents had suffered and
would continue to suffer over the birth of their afflicted child.2 6
Specifically excluded as a recoverable element of damages were the
pecuniary expenses that would arise from providing special care, treatment, and education for their child. The court found that such damages would be disproportionate to the defendants' "culpability" and
would unjustly place the entire burden of child rearing on the defendants while the parents reaped all the benefits of parenthood."
Stressing the high value society places on life regardless of the
presence or absence of handicaps, the court found the child had not
suffered any damages cognizable at law by being brought into existence.2" The court reasoned that the joys and pleasures the child
would experience by virtue of being alive would outweigh any physical
or emotional pain and suffering she might endure. The child's action,
21. Amniocentesis involves the testing of the amniotic fluid drawn from mother
by perforating the abdominal wall after the fifteenth week of gestation. The procedure
identifies certain genetic and chromosomal problems, as well as the sex and blood type
of the fetus. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 97-99.
22. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
26. Id.at 433, 404 A.2d at 15.
27. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
28. Id. at 429-30, 404 A.2d at 12-13.
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therefore, was dismissed for failure to state an actionable claim for
relief.29
ANALYSIS

A. The Parents' Cause of Action
In recognizing the parents' cause of action, the Berman court
acknowledged that since Roe v. Wade,3 ° public policy supported rather
than militated against the woman's right to make a "meaningful"
decision on whether or not to abort. The court, therefore, recognized a
duty on the part of the physicians to conform to the professional
standard of care in providing genetic counseling and testing and that
failure to do so could negligently interfere with the parents' decision to
abort. In rather narrowly defining the physician's liability, the court
draws from Justice Weintraub's dissenting opinion in Gleitman. 1
Weintraub would have awarded the Gleitmans the monetary equivalent
of the emotional distress resulting from having lost the opportunity to
abort.3 2 The majority in Berman interpreted this to be the valuation of
the emotional distress over the child's condition."
Justice Handler, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Berman, attempted to expand upon the nature of this injury by describing
the loss of the parents' opportunity to choose to abort or give birth as
an irreversible moral and ethical injury.3 ' Drawing upon medical and
psychological studies of parents with severely handicapped children,
Justice Handler felt that a foreseeable and compensable consequence
of this lost opportunity was a condition he described as "impaired
parenthood." Because the parents had been denied the opportunity to
know in advance of the child's condition, they would be less capable of
coping emotionally with the child and fulfilling their parental roles. 35
The difficulty in measuring damages that posed such an obstacle in
Gleitman was viewed by both the majority and dissent as inadequate
grounds for denying the action. They chose to compensate for less
concrete elements such as emotional distress and impaired parenthood
but were unwilling to allow compensation for medical treatment and
rearing costs that were capable of more precise valuation. Yet, without
explanation, the Berman court declined to note that in four of the six
29. Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
32. Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 712.
33. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
34. Id. at 439-40, 404 A.2d at 18.
35. Id. at 440-41, 404 A.2d at 18-19.
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most recent genetic counseling cases, though other damages were allowed, emotional distress damages were explicitly denied.3 Nor did the
Berman court note that in a fifth genetic counseling case the court was
only willing to state that special treatment expenses would be compensable and left the question of whether other damages could be
recovered to be resolved on remand. 7
In reaching this rather contradictory result, the court acknowledged that the medical and pecuniary expenses of raising the child
were "caused" by the defendants' breach, but relied upon arguments
that appear in negligent sterilization cases to deny all but the emotional
distress damages. The two cases relied upon, Rieck v. Medical Protective Services3 8 and Coleman v. Garrison,39 represent the view that a
child is always a benefit and that to allow recovery for rearing expenses
would be disproportionate to the defendant physician's culpability. 0
In Rieck, for example, the plaintiff alleged that she would have
aborted her healthy fetus had the physician not been negligent in fail36. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977); modified sub
nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(denied emotional distress because of uncertainty of measurement and mitigating effects from joys of parenthood); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (denied emotional distress because injury was to child, impossibility of measuring benefits of parenthood against claimed emotional distress,
would place an unreasonable burden on the defendant); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (denied emotional distress damages as too speculative).
The only decision specifically allowing emotional distress damages was Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977). Since the consolidated opinion of
Becker v. Schwartz and Park v. Chessin, the controlling precedent in New York would
be the denial of emotional distress damages. This position has received criticism from
the commentators, particularly since New York has allowed emotional distress
damages in situations where a duty was owed to the plaintiff even though there had
been no physical impact or physical consequences. See Johnson v. State of N.Y., 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (woman allowed to recover for
her emotional distress when mental hospital erroneously informed her that her mother
had died). For discussions favoring recovery of damages for emotional distress see
generally, Capron, supra note 5; Comment, Howard v. Lecker: An Unreasonable
Limitation on a Physician'sLiability in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEW ENGLAND L.
REv. 819 (1977); Comment, Fatherand Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of
Physiciansfor Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Father and Mother Know Best]; Note, Wrongful Birth and Emotional
Distress: A Suggested Approach, 38 U. PITT. L. REv. 550 (1970).
37. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
38. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
39. 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
40. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957) (stating that the
physician should not have to bear all the burden of child rearing while the plaintiff
parents derived all the benefits); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974) (recovery for child rearing expenses would be disproportionate to
the defendant's negligence).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/8
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ing to diagnose her pregnancy.' The Supreme Court felt it would
violate public policy to require the physician to bear the economic
burden of raising the healthy child while the mother derived all the
benefits of parenthood.4 2 The court in Berman chose to rely upon the
reasoning of the Wisconsin court and to overlook that same court's
reasoning in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,"3 a more factually
similar case decided the following year. In Dumer the physician had
failed to diagnose the woman's illness as Rubella, had failed to determine that she was pregnant, and accordingly had failed to advise her
of the risks to her fetus. In allowing compensation for the care and
treatment expenses, the Dumer court distinguished Rieck on the basis
that here the parents only sought the special expenses they would encounter in tending to the child's disabilities." The Berman court did
not explain why it chose to follow Rieck instead of Dumer, which was
more on point.
Futhermore, the court failed to explain why it chose to rely on
Coleman v. Garrison.4' Even within the negligent sterilization cases,
Coleman stands out as an exception to the growing trend that allows
the parents to recover child rearing expenses.' 6 Coleman reverts to the
41.

64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). Rieck, though often treated as a

negligent sterilization case, does not fit comfortably in that category, but rather is a
case involving the allegedly negligent failure to diagnose a pregnancy in time for the
mother to abort her fetus.
42. Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45. The court was also concerned that a contrary holding would encourage fraudulent claims by mothers seeking a child rearing expenses for their normal children.
43. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
44. Id. at 775, 233 N.W.2d 376.
45. 345 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (failure of tubal ligation).
46. The first decision in which parents were allowed full recovery for all damages
proximately flowing from a negligently performed sterilization operation was Custodio
v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (allowing medical expenses, pain and suffering relating to childbirth and rearing expenses subject to the offsetting value of the
benefits of parenthood); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, Minn. - , 260 N.W.2d
169 (1977) (allowing prenatal and postnatal medical expenses, pain and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, costs of raising child subject to offsetting value of child's
aid, comfort and society during life of parents); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,
356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (allowing, inter alia, value of loss of the mother's society, care
and protection during and after unwanted pregnancy, expenses due to change in family
status, rearing costs of unwanted child); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (allowing all damages that were direct and natural consequence of
the defendant's negligence); Rivera v. State of N.Y., 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d
950 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (allowing medical expenses, pain and suffering, rearing expenses
subject to defendant's ability to prove offsetting benefits of parenthood). But see
Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977) (allowing recovery only for
the costs and pain and suffering resulting from failed sterilization operation); Terrell v.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (finding that the benefits of parenthood
outweigh as a matter of law any monetary injuries).
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arguments raised in Gleitman that the damages would be too speculative, and further stresses that the benefits of life outweigh, as a matter of law, any damages that might have resulted from this unwanted
birth.'
The reliance on Coleman and Rieck is even more tenuous in view
of the apparent opposite position of New Jersey on the same issue of
compensation for damages resulting from negligently performed sterilization operations. Though the New Jersey Supreme Court has not
passed on this issue, the state's Superior Court in Betancourt v.
Gaylor" found that since decisions concerning procreation are within
the individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy, when a
physician interferes with that right by negligently performing a
sterilization operation he should be responsible for any and all
damages the plaintiff can establish as flowing from the failed operation, including child rearing expenses. 9 If the parents received benefits
from the birth of their healthy, but unwanted child, these could be
calculated to offset the damages, but the balancing of benefits and
losses would be left to the trier of fact.5 0 This handling of the "benefits
of parenthood" is in marked contrast to that of the Berman court.
Rather than allowing the "benefits" to serve as an offset to damages
within the jury's calculations, the Berman court used them as a total
bar to recovery for medical and child rearing expenses. The placement
of such emphasis on the benefits of child rearing is particularly odd as
the Berman child, suffering from severe mental and physical abnormalities, would probably not be able to provide the parents with as
many so called benefits as the healthy child in the Betancourt decision.
47. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
48. 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (failed tubal ligation resulting in
birth of healthy child).

49. Id.
50. Id. at 74-75, 344 A.2d at 340. The issue of weighing the benefit of childrearing
as a means of offsetting the pecuniary and emotional losses has been raised in a
number of decisions. In so doing, courts have attempted to apply the so called benefit
rule of the Restatement of Torts which states:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). The courts have varied in their application of the Rule. Compare Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967) (joys of parenthood can only be used to offset same interest or emotional distress) with Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (interests indistinguishable, and joys of parenthood may be used to offset all damages
recoverable). The decisions do agree that it is a measurable item. See also Kashi, supra
note 18, for an excellent discussion on the application of the benefit rule.
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The court in Betancourt went to considerable length to distinguish
the facts in Gleitman" from the facts before it in order to avoid Gleitman as controlling precedent. An examination of the reasoning in
Betancourt coupled with the cursory explanation for limiting damages
provided in Berman sheds some light on why the Berman court may
have chosen to draw on cases with distinguishable fact patterns to limit
the defendants' liability.
The court in Betancourt said that in Gleitman, the plaintiffs did
not want a child with severe abnormalities, yet the child had already
been conceived and the parents could only have avoided the consequences by aborting the fetus." In distinguishing Betancourt, the
Superior Court explained that the plaintiffs did not want any child,
sought to avoid pregnancy through a sterilization operation, and were
denied the opportunity to be freed the expense of raising a child
because the defendant negligently performed the operation." Yet
parents who do not want a child suffering from severe abnormalities
are no less deserving of compensation than parents who do not want
any child. The real distinction between the two causes of action is that
in the former the defendant negligently interfered only with the
parents' right to abort."' To use the Berman court's description,
negligent interference with the right to abort is apparently a less
culpable form of negligence." Though both the decision to procreate
and the decision to abort are within the mother's constitutionally pro51. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
52. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
53. Id.
54. Arguably, greater proof problems exist in cases where the parents allege that
they would have aborted the fetus had they known it would be afflicted with a severe
abnormality. When a parent decides to have a sterilization operation, he or she is making it clear in advance of any unfortunate consequences, that it is his or her intent not
to bear any children. Should a child subsequently be born, the causal connection between the physician's act of negligence and the child's birth can more surely be drawn.
The parent's desire not to have children can be objectively assessed by their submission
to the sterilization operation. In the case where an afflicted child is born, the courts
may be hesitant to place as much weight on the parents' claim via hindsight, that they
would have chosen to abort. In the Berman decision, however, the court was reviewing
a lower court's granting of summary judgment against the plaintiffs and therefore had
to treat all of the plaintiffs' allegations as true for the purposes of its review. Berman
v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). The question was not could the Berman's
prove their allegations, but rather, given that they would be able to establish each
allegation, did they have a legally cognizable claim for relief. Even though the court
was to accept as true each of the plaintiffs' allegations, the court may still have had
reservations about plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate causation in such cases and
therefore sought some means of limiting the physician's liability.
55. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 18.
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tected right to privacy,5 6 negligent interference with those rights by
physicians is receiving comparatively disparate treatment. 7
Though the Berman decision is somewhat exceptional in that it
allowed emotional distress damages and not special damages, it
represents a tendency in genetic counseling cases to limit damages in
some way. 8 The limited damage awards in genetic counseling cases are
in marked contrast to the increasingly broad range of damages being
allowed in negligent sterilization cases. 59 Arguments against full compensation are now being accepted in genetic counseling cases that have,
with increasing regularity, been dismissed as unfounded obstacles to
60
recovery in negligent sterilization cases.
The question then becomes whether an acceptable explanation can
be found for these discrepancies and whether it provides a sound basis
for the different trends in these two groups of cases. In both types of
cases, assuming the mother can prove her allegations, the physician has
deviated from the professional standard of care in his treatment of her.
In one situation, this breach involves the negligent performance of an
operation. In the other situation the physician has negligently failed to
advise her of known birth defect risks and of procedures available for
verifying the existence of those defects. In the first instance, the
defendant's negligence has thwarted the woman's decision not to procreate. In the second instance, his negligence has thwarted her decision
not to give birth to a child suffering from severe physical and mental
abnormalities. A foreseeable consequence of the physician's breach in
both situations is the birth of a child that the woman does not want, a
child that she may be both emotionally and financially incapable of
56.

(1965).

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

57. Both Capron, supra note 5, and Robertson, supra note 18, note the differences in damages recoverable in the two types of cases.
58. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 49 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978) (allowing raising expenses but disallowing emotional distress damages);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (allowing only special costs relating to
caring for child's abnormalities and disallowing general rearing expenses and parents'
emotional distress); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975) (allowing extra expenses for child's condition but not general rearing expenses).
59. See note 46 supra.
60. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(refuting arguments that child is always a benefit and that the defendant should not
bear all the burden of child rearing while parents derive all the benefits); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (disagreeing that damages are too
speculative); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (discounting argument of waiting for legislative enactment).
See also Note, Theories Upon Which Wrongful Birth Suits Have Been Grounded,
48 UMKC 1 (1979), for a discussion of the rationale behind denying recovery in genetic
counseling cases.
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raising. Arguably, cases in which the mother claims that she would
have aborted her fetus had she known of its severe abnormalities pose
more difficult proof problems because the line of causation is not as
direct as in negligent sterilization cases." But whether she would have
obtained an abortion is a question of fact that should be left to the
trier of fact. Given that the mother can prove her allegations in the
genetic counseling cases, the damaging consequences of the
defendant's negligence are at least as great and probably greater than
when she must suffer the birth of an unwanted healthy child. She will
have not only the normal expenses of food and clothing, but also the
added expense of the special care and treatment required by the abnormal child. Further, any benefits she receives by virtue of being a parent
will probably be less than the mother who must raise an additional
healthy child. In view of these consequences, to describe the defendant's negligence in genetic counseling cases as less culpable makes little sense. Though abortion is a sharply disputed right, it enjoys, at
least for the time being, the same constitutionally protected status
given to the decisions concerning procreation. Courts should not,
therefore, denegrate its importance by providing external limits to
liability for physicians who fail to keep pace with the professional
community's standard of care in genetic counseling. As with the
61. It has been suggested that despite the attendant proof problems, causation
must be established through a subjective standard to determine whether these parents,
not just the objectified "reasonable parents," would have sought an abortion. Father
and Mother Know Best, supra note 36, at 1509-10.
If prior to conception and/or during the first trimester of pregnancy, the parents
actively seek to determine if their child will have severe abnormalities, it may be easier
for them to establish that they would have aborted. Absent this overt concern, the
parents may have some difficulty in establishing that the physician's failure to properly
advise them was the proximate cause of their giving birth to a severely disabled child.
They would have to demonstrate that the risks were sufficiently discernible that the
doctor should have been alerted to their presence; that he failed to conform to the professional standard of care by not warning them of the risks; that having been warned
they either would never have conceived or, if the woman was already pregnant when
she saw the doctor, that she would have had the amniocentesis procedure performed;
that the procedure would have .detected the abnormalities; and that having been informed of the abnormalities the mother would have chosen to abort.
Problems could arise in establishing what constitutes the requisite standard of care
with which to compare the defendant's conduct. See Capron, supra note 5.Further
proof problems could arise because amniocentesis is not a perfectly safe or perfectly
reliable procedure. See Friedman, supra note 4. Nonetheless, although the genetic
counseling cases pose some challenging proof problems, ever increasing advancements
in the area seem to indicate that it is a cause of action that is here to stay. Further, the
complexities of genetics and the rapidity with which technological advancements are
made, militate in favor of not hinging the parents' cause of action on whether they actively sought to determine if their child would suffer geneteic or chromosomal
disorders.
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developing trend in negligent sterilization cases, the defendant should
be liable for all damages naturally flowing from his breach of duty.'"
B. The Child's Cause of Action
Though the parents' cause of action has received mixed treatment
by the court, the child's cause of action has been disposed of with
almost monotonous uniformity. The courts have generally been unwilling to hold, from the child's perspective, that he would have been better off not having been born. 3 The Gleitman court based its dismissal
on the impossibility of measuring damages." This argument for denying a cause of action was questionable at the time 5 and has lost even
62. This conclusion has been reached by commentators with a great deal more
regularity than by the courts. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 54 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1977) is the only decision in which all damages have been allowed. Commentators
have urged recovery under normal tort principles. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 5, at
682; Robertson, supra note 18, at 1454; Waltz and Thigpen, Genetic Screening and
Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 696, 754 (1973); Note,
Wrongful Birth in the Abortion Context-Critique of Existing Case Law and Proposal
for Future Actions, 53 DEN. L.J. 501 (1976). Contra, Comment, Wrongful Birth
Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REv. 127 (1978).
63. The child's cause of action has been allowed in only two instances, one of
which has been overturned on appeal. In Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 49 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the contention in part was that the parents would never have
conceived if they had received accurate information concerning the hereditary nature
of polycystic kidneys. In allowing the child's cause of action, the lower court said that
the infant should be allowed to recover for the pain and suffering caused by this
preconception tort, stressing that the child has a right to be born as a whole functional
human being. The New York Court of Appeals denied that such a right existed and
dismissed the child's action on the bases of the impossibility of calculating damages
and the lack of a legally cognizable injury.
A more recent decision in California also allowed the child to maintain an action.
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 2 Civ. No. 58192 (Cal. Ct. App., filed July 11,
1980). Preconception tests had failed to diagnose the parents as Tay-Sachs carrers
though they subsequently gave birth to a child suffering from the disease. The court
said that public policy and the difficulty in measuring damages were invalid excuses for
denying recovery to the child. Describing the child's injury as birth with defects that
should have been detected, the court said it was beside the point that the child could
not have been born healthy. The court stressed that she exists, has rights, and suffers
because of the defendants' negligence. Id. It is too soon to know if the decision will
stand. Should the California Supreme Court affirm this decision, it will certainly be a
breakthrough.
64. Had the defendant not been negligent, the Gleitman child never would have
been born. The court found it impossible to calculate the difference between nonexistence and life in an impaired state. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689
(1976).
65. At the time Gleitman was decided, the Supreme Court had many years
previously decided Story Parchmant Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555 (1931). As Justice Jacobs points out in his dissenting opinion in Gleitman, Story
Parchment emphasized that compensation should not be denied merely because the
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more favor in the intervening years." The Berman court, therefore,
emphasized that the defendants' negligence had not "caused" the
child's pain and suffering but had only "caused" the child's life.6 7 The
court reasoned that since our society places a high value on all life,
regardless of the presence of physical or 68mental abnormalities, the
child had not been injured by being born.
Popular though this line of reasoning is, 6 9 it glosses over a meaningful consideration of the nature of the mother's decision to abort or
to continue with her pregnancy. If a mother's decision to abort is viewed as only being made on her own behalf, then when a physician negligently interferes with that decision by failing to provide adequate information, arguably, the damage is only to the mother. If, however,
the decision is viewed as also being made on behalf of the child, the
mother in essence is also saying, "I, the child, would rather not be
born," then the negligent interference with that decision damages both
the mother and the child. An analysis of the nature of the mother's
decision should become a question of fact for the trier of fact."
In some situations, such as Rieck, 7" when the mother would have
sought an abortion of her fetus regardless of its condition, the trier of
nature of the tort makes it difficult to determine damages with certainty. Justice
Jacobs also noted that the harm to the family included medical expenses capable of
fairly precise valuation and emotional distress, no less capable of valuation than frequently awarded pain and suffering damages. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 49,
227 A.2d 689, 704 (1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The Berman court agreed, thirteen
years later, that Story Parchment provided precedent for not dismissing an action solely on the basis of not being able to precisely calculate damages. Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 428, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
66. A number of wrongful life cases decided after Gleitman specifically stated
that difficulty in measuring damages should not bar a legitimate claim for relief. See,
e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 189 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. - , 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 76, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57
A.D.2d 73, 79, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 161,
404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
67. 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
68. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
69. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (child has not suffered damages cognizable at law); Smith v. United States,
392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (defendant did not cause child's condition and
child has not suffered damages congnizable at law); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (law cannot decide if child would be
better off never having been born; child has not suffered legally cognizable damages);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (impossible to
compare nonexistence with life in an impaired state).
70. See Capron, note 5 supra, for a discussion that emphasizes that the parents'
decision to have a eugenic abortion is similar to other decisions made on behalf of their
minor child.
71. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(failure to diagnose mother's pregnancy in time for her to obtain a legal abortion).
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fact might find that the decision to abort would have been made by the
mother primarily for her own interests. In a case such as Park v.
Chessin," however, where the affliction of the child is so great, and
the pain and suffering and premature death so certain and predictable,
the fact finder might conclude that the mother would have made the
decision to abort for the sake of both her child and herself.7 3 Birth and
life in a seriously impaired state then become consequences that both
the child and mother would have sought to avoid. The argument the
Berman court presents, that the physicians' negligence may not have
caused the abnormalities since they did not harm an otherwise healthy
fetus, 7 ' fails to recognize the true nature of the injury to the mother
and child. When a fetus is destined to be born with severe genetic and
chromosomal birth defects, life and crippling physical and mental abnormalities are an inseparable unity. If the physicians' negligence has
caused the birth of a tortured child that the mother, speaking on her
own behalf and on behalf of her child, would have sought to avoid,
then he has also caused the child's pain and suffering that inevitably
coincides with that birth. If a jury determines that the mother and the
child would have found nonexistence to be a preferable state, the court
should be precluded from injecting its own moral evaluation that the
child is better off alive."
72. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom.
Becker v. Schwartz, 49 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (child
born with hereditary disease of Polycystic kidneys from which she died after 2/ 2 years
of life).
73. In Jacobs v. Theimer, for example, the physician had failed to diagnose the
mother's illness as Rubella. The child was subsequently born with defective major
organs. The mother's statement in her deposition is quoted by the court as follows:
I would have gone to any length to have found out what the chances of my child
were, and after having found this out, I would have done the kindest thing that I
could have known to have done for her, and that would have been to terminate
the pregnancy.
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (quoting from mother's deposition).
74. 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
75. Capron, supra note 5,at 659, provides an excellent discussion of the method
by which damages could be assessed once the jury concluded that nonexistence would
be a preferable state as compared to the suffering the child must endure. Capron
argues against comparing the child's condition with a "normal" life because the child
with the hereditary abnormality could never have been normal. Instead Capron urges
that comparing nonexistence to life with impairments requires no more speculation
than other damage assessments left to juries. He feels the jury is capable of determining "just how much better" nonexistence would be.
See also Comment, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested
Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REv. 58 (1971), for a discussion of damage assessments that
ascribes plus, minus, and zero values to life, life with severe defects, and nonexistence
as a means of determining the child's damages.
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The court's discussion on the high value we place on all lives is
somewhat beside the point."' The contention is not that once a child is
born it should be consigned to an existence with diminished rights
because of its abnormalities. More to the point is whether we will ever
allow a mother to say for her own sake and for that of her child, that
she would rather not give birth to a child she knows will be severely
disabled. If, as the Berman court contends, life is always the preferable
alternative, then much of the thrust behind genetic counseling and the
benefit gained from amniocentesis and, more certainly, all eugenic
abortions would contravene public policy. To hold as a matter of law
that life is always preferable denies the mother the right to decide, for
whatever reasons, within the first trimester of pregnancy whether her
child will come into existence as a separate being.
Though the Berman majority provides a rather standard disposal
of the child's cause of action, the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Handler provides a novel approach to recognition of the child's
claim. 7 6 Referring to his analysis that the parents might suffer from impaired parenthood, Justice Handler urges that the child should have a
cause of action for diminished childhood." Justice Handler, however,
does not make it clear how one would go about demonstrating that he
suffered from diminished childhood and further clouds the issue by indicating that any award of such damages should go to providing care
and treatment for the child."' Such an element of damages would seem
to require an evaluation of the quality of the parenting the child is
receiving. By recognizing diminshed childhood as a legitimate cause of
action, the court could be inviting suits in which a child proceeded
against his parents for not conforming to parental standards.
Regardless, two problems with such a claim remain. The first is the
need to demonstrate that the child's parents are somehow inadequate
and that, as a result, the child suffers. The second problem is that if
the parents have borne up well in the face of tragedy and are good
parents, they would be penalized by not receiving compensation that,
according to Justice Handler, would have gone to the care and treatment of their child.
Perhaps of more significance than Justice Handler's description of
the child's cause of action is that for the first time, a justice of a state's
highest court has been willing to acknowledge that the child should
have any actionable claim. A California Court of Appeals has already
76.

Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 426, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979) (Handler, J., con-

curring and dissenting opinion).
77.

Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 19.

78.

Id.
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seized upon this acknowledgement as authority for recognition of the
child's cause of action, even though the description of that cause of action and the damages recoverable were significantly different than
what was proposed by Justice Handler.7 9 The California court was
willing to allow the child to recover medical and treatment expenses,
and compensation for pain and suffering, but said nothing of damages
for diminished childhood. If this California opinion is allowed to
stand, it would appear that Justice Handler may have provided the
necessary chink in the thus far impenetrable bar to the child's cause of
action.
CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Berman v. Allan was
a modest step forward from its opinion seventeen years earlier in Gleitman v. Cosgrove. Though the court was willing to recognize the
parents' cause of action, it chose to limit the damages to compensation
for the emotional distress they had suffered and would continue to suffer over the condition of their impaired child. To limit damages, the
court drew upon the reasoning of a line of negligent sterilization cases
that had denied rearing costs to parents who have given birth to
healthy children. As a result it placed a more conservative limit on the
defendants' liability than has been applied in other post Gleitman
genetic counseling cases. The Berman decision, however, is consistent
with other genetic counseling cases in placing a limit on the defendants' liability that has not been felt necessary in an increasing number
of negligent sterilization cases.
79. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 2 Civ. No. 58192 (Cal. Ct. App., filed
July 11, 1980). In Curlender, only the child's action was before the court, the parents
having filed a separate action on their own behalf. The child was born suffering from
Tay-Sachs disease although the parents had been assured by the defendant laboratories
that they were not carriers of the disease. The court allowed the child to maintain an
action with possible damages including compensation for physical and mental pain and
suffering, medical expenses, and punitive damages (if the plaintiff could establish the
requisite elements). In finding that the child could maintain an action in her own right,
the court went further than necessary, by speculating in dicta that had the parents been
properly informed of the risks yet proceeded to conceive and give birth to an afflicted
child, then the child could have brought an action against the parents. This conclusion
is not compelled by allowing the child's action against the laboratories. The decision to
abort is the mother's (or parents') and informing that decision are a number of factual,
moral, and religious parameters that may compel a decision one way or the other,
depending upon the individual. It is always an option, never an obligation, even when
made on behalf of the child. In both situations, the mother decides for the child that
he or she would be better off alive or better off not being born. The court should not
inject its own evaluation of the alternative she should have selected. See Capron, supra
note 5, for a more extended analysis of the nature of the mother's (parents') decision.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/8

1981]

NOTES

As long as the rights to procreate and to abort in the first trimester
of pregnancy share the same constitutional protection, the right to
abort should not be treated as a lesser right by limiting the defendant's
liability. If the physician has deviated from the professional standard
of care by failing to properly inform and/or test the parents and fetus,
and if the parents can prove they would have obtained an abortion, the
defendant should be liable for all provable damages proximately flowing from his negligent omission.
If courts continue to be uncomfortable with cases in which the opportunity to abort has been negligently thwarted, the Berman decision
may prove to be a more conservative and comfortable alternative for
handling the parents' cause of action. On the other hand, the decision
may serve as a basis for expanding the compensable damages in genetic
counseling cases to include damages for the parents' emotional distress
in addition to the pecuniary expenses of caring for and raising an afflicted child.
The dismissal of the child's cause of action by the court fails to
recognize that in some situations the mother believing the child is better off not being born makes that decision on behalf of her child. The
nature of the mother's decision should be determined by the trier of
fact. If the child's impairment is determined to be sufficiently certain
and severe that the mother would have made the decision for the
child's sake as well as her own, then the physician should be responsible for the pain and suffering the child must now endure.
Only Justice Handler in his dissent offers new food for thought on
the child's cause of action. His willingness to concede that the child
has also been damaged by the defendants' negligence may provide a
starting point for a more rational analysis and eventual acceptance of
the child's claim.
Caroline Brower

Published by eCommons, 1981

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/8

